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ABSTRACT
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian republics,
which had not really sought independence, found themselves inde-
pendent.  Unlike what happened in some other parts of the former
Soviet Union, the regimes in power under the Soviet Union
remained in power, and endeavored through authoritarian means
and trying to identify themselves with nascent nationalisms to sup-
press opposition and seek an aura of legitimacy.  These regimes
sought to suppress expressions of Islam and Islamic revivalism out-
side of state-sponsored Islam.  Particularly in the aftermath of 11
September, it has been expedient for these regimes to label non-
state-sponsored Islam as Wahhabi, even  though most of this Islam
has been of the more moderate indigenous Hanafi school.  Progress
in democratization has varied among the republics but has been
slow in all of them.  Until the overthrow of Askar  Akayev in
Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, only Tajikistan, which had experienced
a civil war, had changed leaders since independence.  This article
expresses concern that a focus on fighting terrorism may lead to a
tendency to overlook issues of human rights and democratization in
these states.
INTRODUCTION
Events in places like Afghanistan have brought attention to the formerly
Soviet Central Asian republics whose location gives them a strategic importance.
It is the argument of this article that this strategic importance and the reality of
Islamist terrorism should not induce Western governments to accept for the sake
of short-term interests a lack of progress in democratization and respect for
human rights that may, if tolerated, jeopardize the long-term stability of the
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region and the interests of the globe, the West, and the republics themselves.
While recognizing the genuine obstacles faced by these states, authoritarian
regimes should be viewed skeptically when they seek to exploit the Islamist threat
cynically as a justification for suppressing legitimate dissent in order to maintain
power.  For our purposes, the term “Central Asia” refers to a region composed of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.  While there
is a certain logic in studying them collectively, there are differences.  Uzbekistan
(Pop. 25,155,064; Area 447,400 sq. km.) is largely desert but with irrigation
became the major producer of cotton for the Soviet economy.  Uzbekistan has
sought to develop policies reflecting Uzbek nationalism.  Kyrgyzstan (Pop.
4,753,003; Area 198,500 sq. km.) has traditionally been viewed as remote and
mountainous, isolated and consequently economically under-developed but until
recently isolated as well from the controversies and chaos that other states in the
region have been forced to confront.  Kyrgyzstan’s pursuit of economic liberal-
ization has so far achieved limited success in producing economic development.
Only 2.5 percent of the land in Turkmenistan (Pop. 4,603,244; Area 488,100 sq.
km.) is arable but the country enjoys impressive oil and natural gas reserves.
Economic development has been closely related to petroleum revenue.
Kazakhstan (Pop. 16,731,303; Area 2,717,300 sq. km.), as well, enjoys consider-
able oil reserves.  Like Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan has pursued policies of econom-
ic liberalization.  Tajikistan (Pop. 6,578,681; Area 143,100 sq. km.) has experi-
enced civil war, and, in the words of Ahmed Rashid:
. . . remains the most disadvantaged of the Central Asian nations.
The economy is in ruins, the government has no control over large
tracts of territory, and the drug smuggling from Afghanistan for
onward journey to Europe has become a major factor in the contin-
ued destabilization of the country.1
Nevertheless, for all their differences, these states have a number of attributes in
common.  All five are predominantly Islamic societies and were included, con-
trary to the popular will, within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  In all
five cases, there was a high degree of specialization and the economies were
closely integrated into the Soviet economy.  Independence followed not as an out-
come of a nationalist movement seeking independence but rather simply as a con-
sequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Martha Olcott reflects that:
Few peoples of the world have ever been forced to become inde-
pendent nations.  Yet that is precisely what happened to the five
Central Asian republics after Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – the
three original signatories of the USSR’s founding 1922 constitution
– met in Minsk on December 8, 1991, and created a new
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).2
Consequently, there is no potential leadership figure with the legitimacy and
moral authority that might come from involvement in an independence move-
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ment.  In short, none of these states had a Mandela-like figure able to command
respect.  
Recent years have witnessed such developments in international politics as
the fall of communism and the Soviet Union, followed by the struggle to create
stable, democratic political systems in formerly authoritarian states; the resur-
gence of nationalism; and the challenge of Islamic revivalism.  Each of these
developments has touched on the recent politics of these states.  In the face of
these developments the governments of these states have encountered problems
that have reflected serious issues of legitimacy and efficacy.
The immediate impetus for this research, at least initially, was not to pur-
sue specialized area studies in Central Asia.  Rather, it followed from work in the
study of religion and politics, which led to the study of specific manifestations of
the influence of religion on politics.  Few things are as capable of motivating indi-
viduals and shaping cultures as religious belief and practice.  In order to avoid the
temptation of overgeneralization about religion and politics, the student of reli-
gion and politics needs to examine a variety of cases in diverse settings in which
religion impacts on the political sphere.  Central Asia would appear to be a poten-
tially useful case.  For our purposes, we shall draw on both the secondary litera-
ture available, and on primary and secondary materials written with the intention
on the part of the authors to assess events, and  with the intention in some cases
on the part of authors to influence events, as well.
Nationalism in Central Asia
Bernard Lewis argues that nationalism emerged gradually in the Middle
East in general, and especially in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.3
While he does not examine the cases of the Central Asian states specifically, what
he observes about the Middle East applies as well in Central Asia.  Until recent-
ly, individuals were more likely to identify themselves as members of a particu-
lar clan, residents of a particular village, adherents of a particular religious faith,
and/or subjects of a particular lord, monarch, or emperor than as members of a
given nation.  Olivier Roy suggests that, prior to the Soviet era, there was little
focus within the region on ethnicity or nationality.4 In ancient times, the region
was culturally and linguistically Persian.  Subsequently, variations of Turkish
replaced variants of Persian as the languages of the masses but Persian remained
the language of higher culture and of government regardless of the actual ethnic
origin of any given dynasty.  However, Iranian influence was limited because Iran
tended to see itself as the protector of Shi’a Islam, and, in spite of the Persian cul-
tural influence, Islam in Central Asia has traditionally been Sunni Islam of the
Hanafi (or Hanafite) school.  None of this, however, should be seen as suggesting
any likelihood of accepting conquest without serious resistance.  Rule by out-
siders has never been easily accepted in this region.  Shireen Hunter observes
that, “The history of Central Asia has been about empires and tribes.  The con-
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cept of nation and nation-state to denote a triangular relationship among territo-
ry, ethno-cultural identity, and political authority is very recent in this region.”5
In The Ends of the Earth, Robert Kaplan writes, “Confused about Turkic
identity?  So are many of the people who inhabit this vast region.  A monochrome
Turkic power bloc, colored on the map in Seljuk blue, is not likely to arise.
Individual and national identities across Turkestan are far too complicated for
that.”6 Nationalism as an object of study can be approached through a focus on
identity, narrative, frames, and institutions.  In the cases of the republics of
Central Asia, the issue of identity can be extremely complicated.  Rule by an
external power might be imposed by military force but it was never accepted
lightly.  Czarist and then Soviet domination was always resented.  The re-settle-
ment of Russians in the republics in an attempt to weaken indigenous nationalism
has led to continuing tensions between Russians and those who are ethnically
Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen.  The presence of substantial
Russian populations and the deliberate Soviet policy that drew republic bound-
aries in order to cut across ethnic lines thereby creating within each republic a
mix of ethnic populations, means that  the Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Kyrgyz, or
Turkmen nations may be seen by some as corresponding with the respective states
and by others as corresponding with ethnicities.  Determining what may be
indigenous to the Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Kyrgyz, or Turkmen nations is compli-
cated not only by these factors.  Until fairly recently, these were nomadic, pre-
dominantly pre-literate societies.  With the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
regimes with little popular legitimacy are not about to jeopardize their power by
dismantling existing state boundaries.  Ironically, with communism no longer
available as an ideological support for a regime in power, post-Soviet regimes,
even when led by individuals associated with the regimes of the Soviet era, have
sought to exploit nationalism in the effort to inspire popular support.   However,
differences persist about precisely what constitutes these identities, and many
find the secular nationalisms espoused by these regimes as inauthentic for a num-
ber of reasons, including the exclusion of the Islamic identity, which many see as
an essential component of Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen identity.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire expanded
into this region, taking over much of the region, establishing a province of
Turkestan ruled by a governor general from Tashkent, while the khanates of
Bukhara and Khiva remained separate but dependent on Russia.  Rashid notes
that: 
Whilst the settled regions were easily conquered, the nomadic tribes
continued to resist for several decades, and periodic revolts broke
out in the Fergana Valley.  In 1885 Russian troops crushed a revolt
in the valley towns of Osh, Margilan, and Andijan led by a Sufi
Dervish, Khan Tura.  The most serious threat to Russian rule arose
in May 1898, when twenty-two Russian soldiers were killed in
Andijan by Islamic rebels.  The revolt spread to other towns before
Russian troops arrived and brutally quashed the rebellion.7
Both the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union resorted to military action
and the settlement of Russians and Cossacks in an effort to quell resistance to out-
side rule and assimilate the local people.  In an attempt to discourage nationalist
revolts, Stalin sowed the seeds for future complications by deliberately drawing
boundaries creating the new republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in such a way as to cross the boundaries of the nation-
al communities in the region.  Olcott notes that, when the states became inde-
pendent, “Central Asia’s leaders were also aware that, although each republic was
named for a local nationality, none was a ‘national homeland.’”8 The outcome is
that there are ethnic minorities throughout the region.  To discourage outside
influences, the Soviet Union replaced the Arabic with the Cyrillic alphabet for the
Turkmen language.
Robert Legvold remarks that in some ways the issues faced by the Central
Asian republics are similar to those faced in other parts of the former Soviet
Union but in two ways differ.  First, Legvold notes that “. . . unlike other parts of
the former Soviet Union, they as a group seemed to be abandoning democratic
aspirations and drifting toward the semi-authoritarian forms familiar in much of
the Third World.”9 Second, he observes that “. . . the fundamental starting point
for the policies of the major powers in Central Asia must be the ‘no-man’s-land’
in which these states find themselves as they battle to create nation-states where
none existed before, fashion workable political orders, and simultaneously put
new economic systems in place.”10 Legvold adds that “The struggle to create a
new post-Soviet political or economic order does not distinguish Kazakhstan
from, say, Ukraine, Georgia, or, for that matter Russia, but the added burden of
doing  this while inventing the nation-state does.”11
In Eastward to Tartary, Kaplan notes that: 
Then Stalin began wave after waves of purges and executions, inter-
spersed with the resettlement in the new Soviet Republic of
Turkmenistan of Russians and other deportees from all over the
Soviet Union.  Almost all educated Turkmens were annihilated.
When Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, its people inher-
ited both a void and a deep suspicion of foreigners.  No other for-
merly Soviet republic had a higher unemployment rate, a higher
infant mortality rate, or a lower literacy rate.12
Kaplan describes being told by a Turkmen bureaucrat and scholar that “. . . there
is a great gap between historical and literary fact and what the government here
declares.  Local scholars know the truth, but they still must recite other ‘facts’ that
are sometimes nonsense – like that the Turkmens discovered America, for exam-
ple.  The truth is that because the Turkmens were nomadic, we were always in
close contact with other cultures: Hellenistic, Parthian, Iranian.  So it is impossi-
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ble to know what, exactly, is Turkmen about us and what is not.”13 The state
known as Turkmenistan is relatively homogeneous ethnically.
Eugene Huskey observes that the Kyrgyz “. . . lacked a national as well as
a civic consciousness before the Soviet period.  Although bound by a common
language, traditions, and legend, the Kyrgyz – like rural French before the twen-
tieth century – had yet to imagine their membership in a national community.”14
As is the case with the other republics, Kyrgyzstan is struggling to form a cohe-
sive community for the purposes of national development in spite of a weak sense
of unity.  Rogers Smith points out how the regime of President Askar Akayev uses
the Kyrgyz epos Manas in an effort “. . . to institutionalize a post-Soviet vision of
the modern Kyrgyz Republic in his constituents’ lives, by presenting the new
Republic as the appropriate heir of the grand traditions the Manas epos embod-
ies.  And he sought to achieve this strengthening, in turn, by using the epos to
reinforce the sense of the Kyrgyz that they are a people, and a people that
deserves to feel proud of its historical, cultural, and political identity, properly
understood.”15 In Kyrgyzstan with substantial Russian and Uzbek minorities and
a history of the use of Russian in administration and education during the Soviet
era, language policy has generated controversy.  Kyrgyz and Russian, but not
Uzbek, are recognized as official languages, and there have been controversies
about whether civil servants and elected representatives should be required to
demonstrate fluency in Kyrgyz.
In examining the case of Kazakhstan, Olcott notes that: 
The country’s leaders proudly boast that Kazakhstan is the most
multinational of all the Soviet successor states, but few who live in
the country seem proud of this ethnic diversity.  Instead, it appears
a source of stress for many.  Outside observers sense that for
Kazakhstan to survive and prosper, its population must develop a
civic-based patriotism to a common homeland rather than an ethnic-
based loyalty to the land of the Kazakhs (or, alternatively, of the
Russians).16
Olcott suggests that ethnonationalism in Kazakhstan has not translated into a
source of legitimacy for the new state, commenting that “.  .  . despite the recent
rewriting of Kazakh history to stress the state-building agendas of their premod-
ern ancestors, the country’s titular nationality has not managed to translate its eth-
nic pride into a coherent and widely accepted ideological defense of its unique
nation-state.”17
Tajikistan is somewhat distinguished by a cultural and linguistic affinity
with the Persian, rather than Turkic, traditions.  Evgeniy Abdullaev suggests that
religiously inspired violence has been more prominent in Tajikistan, and, to a
lesser degree, Uzbekistan because the Tajiks have traditionally been closer cultur-
ally to Iran, and hence more influenced by the more radical Shi’a tradition of
Islam, while the Uzbeks occupy a position where Iranian Shi’a and Turkic Sunni
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influences co-exist.18 In contrast, the Turkic cultures of Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan have been associated with Turkic cultures and the
Sunni tradition of Islam.
Kaplan remarks that, “It is not only irrational borders with which Uzbeks
and others in Turkestan have to contend: They must also rebuild, even reinvent, a
national past out of preconceived myths, compounded by the historical erasures
of communism.”19 He notes that, “Another regional specialist, Edward A.
Allworth, observes that today in Central Asia, nationalities are being created ret-
rospectively.  And not always accurately: Statues of Tamerlane are going up in
Uzbekistan to honor an ‘Uzbek national hero,’ even though Tamerlane was not an
Uzbek.  In truth, it was the Uzbeks who toppled Tamerlane’s dynasty when they
defeated Babur.”20
The presence of ethnic minorities, including Russian minorities, through-
out the region complicates relations  not only within each republic but also among
the republics, and between the Central Asian republics, on the one hand, and
Russia, on the other.  Throughout the former Soviet Union, uncertainty has aris-
en as to whether political identity follows from ethnicity, regardless of the succes-
sor-state in which one resides, or from residency within the boundaries of a par-
ticular republic, regardless of ethnicity.  Rogers Brubaker observes that: 
The Soviet nationality regime, with its distinctive and pervasive
manner of institutionalizing nationhood and nationality, has trans-
mitted to the successor states a set of deeply structured, and power-
fully conflicting, expectations of belonging.  Successor state elites,
with their deeply institutionalized sense of political ownership and
entitlement, see the polities that bear the names of their respective
nations – above all the territory and institutions, but also, with some
ambivalence, the population as well – as ‘their own,’ as belonging,
in a fundamental sense, to them.21
Graham Smith notes that “. . . from the outset, a tension existed between estab-
lishing a citizen-polity in which individuals were to be treated equally, and the
role that was envisaged for the titular nation within the socio-economic and polit-
ical life of the citizen-homeland.”22
In each of these republics, post-Soviet regimes, without any moral author-
ity stemming from being associated with pre-independence nationalist move-
ments and lacking credibility from involvement in any dissident movements,
sought to legitimize themselves and inspire some sort of national consciousness
to maintain national unity.  Such regimes sought to stimulate development and
ground a sense of national identity on the basis of a narrative.  Pauline Jones
Luong observes that “Although the exact mix of tradition and modernity in their
rhetoric and actions varies from case to case, the legitimation strategies of all five
Central Asian leaders exploit tradition to mask more modern forms of authoritar-
ian rule.”23 Reinhard Schulze suggests that “. . . since the nationalists in the sud-
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denly independent republics by no means wanted to acknowledge the fact that
their states were really the product of Leninist and later Stalinist minority poli-
cies, they had to resort to sometimes invented, and often mythical traditions to
provide their state with the history it lacked.”24 One way in which these narratives
have come to be contested is that narratives focussing on the history of Uzbek,
Tajik, Kazakh, Turkmen, or Kyrgyz peoples as the determinants of identity have
confronted narratives in which being Uzbek or Tajik or Kazakh or Turkmen or
Kyrgyz can be understood only when associated with an indigenous Islamic cul-
ture.  Until the recent Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the regime that inherited
power at the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union remained in all the
republics but Tajikistan.  Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that these
regimes have persisted in Soviet attitudes toward religion in general and Islam
specifically.
The Influence of Islamic Revivalism
Although most commentators conventionally discuss the impact in the
region of Islamic revivalism (or Islamism, sometimes also referred to as Islamic
fundamentalism), this depiction may call for some caveats.  Almond, Appleby,
and Sivan, in their study of religious fundamentalism, adopt a classificatory
scheme which distinguishes among “religious fundamentalism,” in which they
see religion as the primary or even sole motivation, and what they term “syncret-
ic fundamentalism,” in which other motivations other than religion are of higher
or equal priority, and “potential and marginal fundamentalisms,” which do not fit
neatly in either of the other categories.  These authors place Islamic revivalism in
Central Asia in the third category, “potential and marginal fundamentalisms,”
rather than the first, on the grounds that “Islamic movements in central Asia since
glasnost and in the early post-Soviet era have been marked by the revival of reli-
gious practice and belief and ethnonationalist fragmentation, with control being
decentralized to the different Islamic regions – Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus,
Azerbaijan, and the like.”25 They observe that: 
Ideologically the revival of Islam rejects the adaptive strategy fol-
lowed by the Muslim clergy under the old Soviet Union; the new
ideological trends in this period were revivalist and traditionalist
rather than fundamentalist.  In some cases such movements are anti-
Russian in the ethnic sense, but (with the exception of Uzbekistan)
they are not organized, focused reactive movements possessed of a
charismatic leadership, clear lines of authority, and a mythologized
or aggrandized enemy against whom they preserve purity and erect
boundaries.26
It is their view that the potential exists for “religious fundamentalism,” as they
define it, to spread to the region.  It should also be noted that not all observers
draw such a sharp distinction between revivalism and “potential fundamental-
ism,” on the one hand, and “religious fundamentalism,” on the other.
Frequently, it is assumed that, with modernization and economic develop-
ment, there will be a trend toward secularization and a decline in the influence of
religion.  In contrast, Peter Berger suggests that religion, especially in its so-
called “fundamentalist” forms, has become increasingly influential in the public
arena.27 Specifically in regards to Islam, Ernest Gellner suggests that traditional-
ly in predominantly Islamic societies strict observance was associated with high-
er-status, urbanized, and more affluent elements within society.28 With increased
affluence, the poor and residents of rural areas can now aspire to the sort of strict
observance of Islamic practice that was previously associated with the upper
classes.
For many citizens of the Central Asian republics, even those who may not
regularly practice the faith, Islam represents an essential element of the Uzbek,
Kazakh, Turkmen, Tajik, or Kyrgyz identity.  Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky
write that Islam’s “. . . importance to the Soviet Central Asians’ identity cannot
be overestimated; it was the force that held them together and provided cultural
and spiritual nourishment when they were under pressure to Sovietize.  More than
nationalism, Islam was often the vehicle for anti-Communism in this region.”29 In
a study of the republics in the period between the Second World War and the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, Yaacov Roi observes that “The broad masses of the
nationalities concerned seem to have considered themselves Muslim throughout
the Soviet period, as well as being Uzbek or Kyrgyz, Turkestani or Caucasian,
members of a given clan or tribe and inhabitants of a certain locality.”30 It is con-
cluded by Roi that “The role played by Islam in the evolution of nationalism with-
in the Soviet Union’s Muslim ethnicities, like that of  other ‘national’ religions in
the development of Russian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalism, was a signif-
icant factor in the nationalist earthquake that eventually helped bring down the
Soviet regime.”31 John Esposito notes that:
Despite Soviet domination and anti-Islam policies in Central Asia,
Islam remains a core component of individual and community iden-
tity and an important part of religious and cultural life.  Following
the breakup of the Soviet Union, Islam has been integral to the
process of nation building in post-independence Central Asia, con-
tributing to the development of new national identities, value sys-
tems, guidelines for social and political life, and new relations with
the Muslim World.32
In the aftermath of the end of Soviet rule, this region has witnessed a per-
verse response on the part of post-Soviet regimes to the influence of Islam.  The
current regimes remain vulnerable and fragile. It is perhaps not so surprising that
regimes, which represent elements of the old communist autocracy seeking to re-
package themselves under banners of nationalism in pursuit of legitimacy and
popular support, have made obvious efforts to maintain the disdain for Islam and
for religion in general characteristic of the Soviet era.  Esposito observes that
regimes have sought to dismiss opposition groups by associating such groups
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with Wahhabi Islam, thereby depicting such opposition as both foreign-inspired
and extremist.33 This region has been slow to develop those institutions integral
to civil society.  Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon suggest that the suppression
of Islam during the Soviet period had the effect of detaching many young
Moslems in the region from their roots in indigenous expressions of Islam, and
left them susceptible to Wahhabi and Deobandi Islam, forms of Islam whose mil-
itancy appealed to many in the face of frustrations with the progress of democra-
tization and economic reform.34 The outcome has been that the influence of
indigenous strains of Islam have been discouraged, and the influence of Islamic
revivalism, rather than being channelled into benign forms conducive to peaceful
political development potentially leading to democracy, has been taken over by
more militant Deobandi and Wahhabi strains that have been propagated from
other parts of the Islamic world.  Organizations like the IMU (Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan), led by Juma Namangani,  have engaged in guerrilla war and ter-
rorism in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  The IMU was linked to Osama bin-Laden
and the Taliban, and assisted the Taliban by attacking the Northern Alliance dur-
ing the civil war in Afghanistan.  Foreign fighters swelled the ranks of the IMU.
On the one hand, the activities of the IMU have reinforced the apprehensions of
the regimes in the Central Asian republics about Islamic revivalism but ironical-
ly state repression of  indigenous and more moderate forms of Islam and Islamic
revivalism has angered many and removed some of the alternative forms for the
expression of that anger and of Islamic religiosity.  Zartman observes that: 
The subject is of crucial importance today in the Algerian,
Sudanese, Egyptian, Tunisian, Afghan, Tajik, Turkish, and other sit-
uations, where liberal secular (if not democratic) politicians seek to
end various degrees of civil strife by arranging dialogue with mod-
erate religious politicians while extremist terrorists (often no longer
with any claim on religion) are demonstrating in the wings.  The
relations between the terrorists and moderates remain unclear, the
moderates’ control over the terrorists uncertain, and the extent to
which an agreement with the moderates would end the terrorism
unassured.35
Gilles Kepel argues convincingly that throughout the Islamic world the
more extremist manifestations of Islamic revivalism are becoming desperate as
the momentum and popular support has moved increasingly in the direction of
manifestations that work through civil society.  He observes that this argument 
“. . . goes against the blinkered vision of those who make the doctrine of Islam
itself an obstacle to the implantation of democracy in any of the countries where
it is the dominant religion, and also to those who attribute to that doctrine a ‘dem-
ocratic essence’.  Islam, like any other religion, is a way of life, one that is given
its shape and form by Muslim men and women.”36 The relatively undeveloped
civil society in the region limits possibilities for Islamic revivalism to work
through institutions of civil society.  Discouragement on the part of regimes of the
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development of civil society and, ironically, repression of both traditional Islam
and forms of Islamic revivalism conducive to civil society, may grant more
extreme forms of Islamic revivalism a longer lease on life than those forms may
enjoy in some other parts of the predominantly Islamic world.
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have advanced a promising approach to
the issue of reconciling the emergence of Islamic revivalism with the assumption
that development should lead to increasing secularization.37 Their approach rests
on two axioms.  The first is that, in spite of development, insecurity and vulnera-
bility will lead people in a given society to look to religion and experience reli-
gious feeling in a more intense manner.  This insecurity, they stress, includes but
is not limited to economic insecurity.  This existential insecurity reflects, as well,
vulnerability to disease, malnutrition, natural disaster, and lack of access to edu-
cation and health-care.  The second axiom suggests that regardless of the degree
to which any individual may have become secularized, he/she will inevitably have
been conditioned by the cultural traditions of a given society that have been
shaped in part by religion.  Norris and Inglehart suggest that “. . . the distinctive
world-views that were originally linked with religious traditions have shaped the
cultures of each nation in an enduring fashion; today these distinctive values are
transmitted to the citizens even if they never set foot in a church, temple, or
mosque.”38
Consideration of conventional indicators like income per capita, life
expectancy, and the literacy rate for the republics will confirm that individuals
have genuine grounds to experience a sense of vulnerability and insecurity.  This
theory would suggest that such a sense is likely to make people feel more intense-
ly the need for religion.  The Norris-Inglehart thesis would lead one to note the
degree of uncertainty and dislocation in the Central Asian republics brought on
by the pressures of rapid transition as the economy moves away from an odd
combination of traditional and command elements toward an odd combination of
traditional and market elements with the ultimate outcome unclear as to which
elements, traditional or market, will prevail.  As well, in the absence of the ideo-
logical forces of communism to lend an aura of legitimacy to the political order,
regimes have encouraged some democratic pretenses while maintaining authori-
tarian practices, and emphasized nationalism in spite of the fact that state bound-
aries, as a consequence of Stalinist policy, cross, rather than coincide with, ethnic
borders.  As people become frustrated with the slow pace of improvement in the
standard of living, they become less certain of the value of democracy and mar-
kets.  This may not be entirely fair – the benefits from the expansion of a market
economy may be long-term, and democracy, for all the rhetoric, has not enjoyed
the consistent or whole-hearted support of regimes in the region.
The Norris-Inglehart approach would also suggest that anyone in these
republics, believer or not, will inevitably be exposed to, and almost certainly be
conditioned, to at least some degree, by the religious tradition via the extent to
which that tradition has come to pervade the political culture.  In considering the
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implications of this, it should be kept in mind that we are not referring simply to
the religious tradition of Islam but to the particular form associated with Hanafi
(or Hanafite) Sunni Islam and its particular history in Central Asia.  Hanafi Islam
tended to be more liberal, more open to accommodating pre-Islamic practices,
and less strict than other forms like the Wahhabi, for example.39 Some of the
Central Asian peoples pursued sedentary lifestyles prior to Soviet occupation,
while others tended to be nomadic prior to Soviet occupation.  In either case, the
Islamic clergy in Central Asia traditionally did not possess the degree of political
authority exercised by clergy in some other parts of the predominantly Islamic
world.  In addition, for those peoples like the Kazakh, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz who
were less likely to follow a settled (or sedentary) lifestyle, Islamic observance in
practice was weaker than among more settled peoples like the Uzbeks and Tajiks.
In each of the republics, there exists a state-controlled official Islam with
clergy employed and regulated by the state. There also exists a parallel (or unof-
ficial) Islam independent of the state.  While there are some militant fundamen-
talist teachers of Islam, these are the exception.  There have been some outbreaks
of militancy but most of the parallel Islamic clergy is Hanafi Sunni Islam.
However, authoritarian regimes in pursuit of sympathy or at least tolerance for
their repression of Islamist and other critics have labelled, especially in the after-
math of 11 September, almost every dissident as Wahhabi, referring to the strain
of Islamic revivalism supported by some Saudi elements.  Murad Esenov argues
that “the politicization of Islam” is more prevalent than the “Islamisation of pol-
itics,” asserting that “Islam is under the strict control of the secular power, not
vice versa.”40 Olcott observes that “Although some who work in the state appa-
ratus that supervise religious institutions are themselves religious believers, many
are not, and are still holdovers from the atheistic communist regime.  Because of
this many believers see the state as an opponent of the faith, rather than its pro-
tector, a perception which often works against the encouragement of moderate
trends within Islam, and serves the goals of radical Islamic groups.”41 She further
asserts that “The Central Asian elites are exaggerating the threat to the state that
is posed by those advocating radical Islamic ideologies, and US policy makers
will be making a great mistake if they allow shared goals in the war on terror to
blind us to the short-sighted and potentially dangerous policies that are being pur-
sued in the region with regards to religion.”42 The repression of moderate
Islamists has led to human rights abuses, weakened the relatively moderate
indigenous forms of Islamism which lack the external support of the Wahhabi ele-
ments, and provided a rationalization used both domestically and internationally
for continuing lack of progress in democratization.
The Fall of Communism and the Path Toward Democratization
While the republics have made varying degrees of progress toward estab-
lishing market economies, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan making more
progress than Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan, none have made the sort
of progress toward democratization that would have been hoped for at the time of
independence.  Recent elections in Uzbekistan in December 2004, Tajikistan in
February 2005, and Kyrgyzstan in February 2005, have been monitored by
observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.  The
outcomes of the latter two of these elections have been especially controversial.
The later years of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact witnessed consid-
erable pressure for change and for human rights emanating out of social and polit-
ical movements like Poland’s Solidarity movement.  The institutions associated
with civil society had developed much further in states like Poland and
Czechoslovakia (later to become the Czech Republic and Slovakia) than in states
like Romania and Bulgaria.  One outcome was that, when communism did fall,
there existed the potential for democratization in Poland and Czechoslovakia that
did not exist in states like Romania where, in the absence of genuinely
autonomous civil society organizations, the post-communist regime was led by
former members of the old communist order.  Similarly, not all the republics of
the Soviet Union were at the same stage of political development.  The Central
Asian republics, although they had witnessed some nationalist agitation over
Russian domination, had not developed the sort of civil society that Poland or
Czechoslovakia or, within the Soviet Union, that the Baltic republics had, and two
crucial outcomes have been that, in the absence of an organized opposition, post-
Soviet regimes in the Central Asian republics have been dominated by former
members of the Soviet regimes, and that the progress of democratization has been
much slower than in the Baltic states, for example.  Karen Dawisha and Bruce
Parrott note that:
On the whole, the sociopolitical situation in the countries of Central
Asia  differs markedly from that in Russia and most of the other new
states.  Although the expansion of political participation and the
depth of the anti-Communist political movement have varied sub-
stantially among Russia and the countries of the western region, in
nearly all instances these developments have surpassed the analo-
gous political phenomena in Central Asia.  If political and econom-
ic holdovers from the Communist system are at least under siege in
the western states, they have a much surer hold on power in most of
Central Asia.43
Reflecting on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, David Remnick remarks that
“The dissolution of the Soviet Union had become inevitable after the collapse of
the August coup, but the haste and vanity of those who dissolved it were extraor-
dinary.  Although they portrayed themselves to their people as national heroes,
many had supported or, at least, were ready to knuckle under to the leaders of the
August 1991 coup attempt.  In time, the leaders of Uzbekistan, Belarus, and
Turkmenistan would establish authoritarian regimes more severe than anything
seen in the Soviet Union since the days of Andropov and Chernenko.”44 Olcott
points out that, whereas often leaders of newly independent states derive popular
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legitimacy from involvement in the movement for independence, the leaders of
the Central Asian republics: 
. . . were inadvertent founding fathers.  Most were once part of the
old Soviet Union’s nomenklatura, which was in turn largely drawn
from the region’s traditional ruling elites.  These leaders were nei-
ther democrats nor dictators, nor nationalist heroes.  Some were
opportunists; most were sincere in the desire to secure their coun-
tries’ economic survival.  All were aware of the highly vulnerable
nature of their nations’ premature births, and each leader recognized
the risks of his own ouster.45
Ahmed Rashid concludes that, rather than encouraging the development of civil
society and respect for human rights, the reality is that “Uzbekistan and other
Central Asian regimes have made no gesture toward reforming their grotesque
record of human-rights abuses.  Muslim believers remain in Uzbek jails, elections
are a farce, there is not even minimal freedom of the press or of assembly, and
torture is commonplace.”46
Gregory Gleason suggests that progress toward democracy in these states
has been limited by a gap between formal institutions and actual processes; a ten-
sion between economic restructuring, which gave rise to some dislocation, and
political reform, an approach to reform that has been top-down; and a security
environment that at times took priority.47 Pauline Jones Luong notes that “The
convergence toward authoritarianism across Central Asia since 1995, then, is a
testament to the declining rather than the rising power of these states.  Waning
legitimacy in the face of declining standards of living and rampant official cor-
ruption has important political as well as economic consequences for these
states.”48
Anticipating the possibility of complete chaos and region-wide war, Karl
Meyer reflects that at least the worst-case scenarios for the region in the aftermath
of the break-up of the Soviet Union, did not materialize, except for a civil war in
Tajikistan and some outbreaks of violence in Uzbekistan.49 To some degree, this
reflected success on the part of the post-Soviet regimes in suppressing opposition
and unrest and, to some degree, the lack of the elements of civil society through
which criticism might be voiced.  In each republic, regimes in power under Soviet
control formed governments under independence, and with the exception of
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, these regimes continue to hold power.  In Uzbekistan,
Islam Karimov remains president.  In Turkmenistan, President Saparmurat
Niyazov continues to hold power, while Nursultan Nazarbayev remains in power
in Kazakhstan.  Only in Tajikistan, where the current president is Emomali
Rahmonov, and Kyrgyzstan, where Askar Akayev had been president since before
independence until his overthrow in March 2005,  has national leadership
changed hands since independence.
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As an example of the sort of authoritarian regime that can be found in the
region, one can consider the case of Turkmenistan.  Rashid remarks that “Nothing
in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era has been quite so bizarre as the personality
cult that President Saparmurad Niyazov has fostered in Turkmenistan.  Starting
in 1991, when Niyazov erected statues and plastered photographs of himself pos-
ing as ‘Turkmenbashi’ (Father of all Turkmens) on walls and squares across the
country, the cult has grown to the point where buildings, streets, even entire cities
have been named after him.”50 Rashid observes that “Even by the authoritarian
standards of the Central Asian regimes, Niyazov’s government is unique: the
most repressive and dictatorial regime in the region.  Political parties are banned,
the government controls all media outlets, meetings of all kinds – even academic
– are forbidden, and Christian and Hindu sect leaders have been thrown out of the
country along with political opposition leaders.”51 Kaplan notes that when he vis-
ited Turkmenistan, “There were no identifiable dissidents: The kind of dissent
that focuses on universal values such as human rights requires urbanity, and the
Turkmens were a nomadic, tribal people, who still wore traditional costumes and
didn’t know the names of streets, perhaps because knowing street names requires
an abstract and impersonal knowledge that is not based on habit.”52 Kaplan fur-
ther observes that “Outrage against the regime was muted.  When I asked why, I
got a one-word answer: ‘Tajikistan.’ Tajikistan was another former Soviet
Republic in Central Asia that had collapsed into violent anarchy, by some counts
split among twelve different warlord-ships.  Turkmenistan was prone to similar
disintegration, and everyone here knew it.”53 Graham Smith suggests that “. . .
nation-building has involved repackaging the idea that strong governance is cen-
tral to the well-being of the homeland polity, based in particular on the notion that
it is only through strong political leadership that both material prosperity and
geopolitical stability will be secured.”54
Some of the issues can be illustrated by an examination of recent events in
Kyrgyzstan.  Conventional wisdom would have suggested that a relatively under-
developed civil society would have made Kyrgyzstan an unlikely place for an
event like the Tulip Revolution.  Conventional wisdom would also have suggest-
ed that if an authoritarian regime were to be overthrown by an event other than a
coup by members of the regime or by members of the military, it would have been
an outcome of an Islamist threat.  Olcott moves from the obvious – that the imme-
diate instigation that culminated in the overthrow of the Akayev regime was an
election generally considered corrupt and dishonest that could have resulted in
the extended tenure in office of Akayev once a legislature friendly to the regime
had changed the rules – to make some thought-provoking points.  While dishon-
est, the election of 2005 was probably closer to a genuinely fair election than pre-
vious elections in Kyrgyzstan since independence.  What had changed were pop-
ular expectations.  Olcott observes that “. . . the elections were more democratic
than the previous parliamentary election, but fell short of being ‘free and fair’ and
more importantly did not meet local expectations.”55 Increasingly, the people of
Kyrgyzstan have become aware of democracy and democratization elsewhere,
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and have become skeptical of excuses for continuing authoritarianism, and impa-
tient with the slow pace of democratization.  Of course, mixed with a desire for
democracy was a frustration with the chronic inability of the government in
power to provide effective government.  Justin Burke observes that “Allegations
of vote-rigging served as the catalyst for the Kyrgyz revolution.  But it was pent-
up frustration among the population over persistent poverty and pervasive gov-
ernment corruption that packed the revolution with its explosive power.  Many
supporters of the revolution aren’t necessarily interested in democracy; they are
preoccupied simply with providing for themselves and their families.”56
Nevertheless, it is interesting that while Kyrgyzstan has long been characterized
by widespread poverty, in recent years the economy has experienced dramatic
improvement, with growth in the gross domestic product of 6.7 percent in 2003,
and the percentage of the population living below the poverty line dropping from
55 percent to 40 percent between 1998 and 2003.57
In March 2002, police responding to demonstrations in support of
Azimbek Beknazarov, on trial after issuing a call for Akayev’s impeachment,
used force to break up the demonstrations.  The deaths of seven unarmed demon-
strators in Aksy precipitated a crisis that threatened Akayev’s hold on the presi-
dency.  Akayev responded by turning to Russia for advice and assistance.  Akayev
replaced the prime minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev, with Nikolai Tanayev, a Russian
who had lived and worked for some years in Kyrgyzstan.  While restricting
opportunities for independent meetings and events, Akayev’s regime initiated dis-
cussion of constitutional change.  A committee of jurists, politicians, and activists
recommended changes that included limiting presidential powers and enhancing
the powers of the prime minister.  Rather than submitting these proposals to a ref-
erendum, the Akayev regime substituted this proposed constitution with another
constitution written in the president’s office.  This latter proposed constitution,
which included a stronger presidency than that recommended by the committee
and made it practically impossible to impeach the president, was submitted to
voters in a referendum in February 2003.  Olcott suggests that “. . . Akayev found
it easier to behave more like the leaders of neighboring Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, and to accept ‘technical assistance’ from Russia designed to help
shape Kyrgyzstan into a ‘guided’ democracy, rather than a society that is recog-
nizably democratic according to western norms.”58
An outcome of these events was that mistrust of Akayev’s intentions and
integrity spread.  Human Dimension Commitments in Central Asia: Achievements
and Challenges, the report of meetings in January 2004 organized by the
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and the Kyrgyz Committee
for Human Rights, in cooperation with the International League for Human
Rights and with funding assistance from the Foreign Ministry of Belgium,
observes that concern was expressed that “In Kyrgyzstan, there were many viola-
tions during the last elections, but the response from the international communi-
ty was inadequate, resulting in an impression being left that such violations can
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occur with impunity.  In relation to the Aksy tragedy, not only were the perpetra-
tors never punished, but in fact they were promoted.”59 Also in 2004, Aziz
Soltobaev, noting restrictions imposed on the media, hypothesizes that “. . . these
extreme measures against the representatives of opposition and mass media on
the part of the authorities could lead to diametrically opposite outcomes and heat
up the situation in republic even further.”60
Elections for a new parliament were held in 2005, with the initial round on
February 27 and the second round on March 13.  While the electoral process was
more fair than in previous elections, the regime went to great lengths to ensure a
parliament sympathetic to Akayev, rejecting some candidacies, engaging in vote-
buying, and pressuring candidates to stand aside.  When two leading opposition
figures, Adakhan Madamarov and the prime minister fired by Akayev,
Kurmanbek Bakiev, each of whom were expected to be elected easily to the new
parliament, were declared to have been defeated in the second round, outrage
grew.  It was believed that Akayev intended to use the new parliament to approve
a new constitution that would waive the term limits precluding Akayev from
again seeking the presidency in October 2005 that ignited the revolution in which
people took to the streets.  Akayev swore in the new parliament, resisted calls for
his resignation, but then fled to Russia.
The popular uprising that caused Akayev to flee originated in the south.
Protestors seized government buildings in Jalal-Abad and Osh.  The crisis that
arose when protests broke out in the capital, Bishkek, starting on 22 and 23 March
2005, ultimately led several days later to Akayev’s flight.  Although he refused to
resign for several days, a provisional government assumed authority.  The protests
do not seem to have been under the control of any single group, and even promi-
nent opposition politicians seem to have been swept along with the tide of events.
The concern over the lack of unity among Akayev’s critics and the danger of
fighting among competing opposition elements was addressed when two poten-
tial rivals cooperated in the formation of the provisional government; Kurmanbek
Bakiev became prime minister and, hence, interim president, and Feliks Kulov
became interior minister.
To be fair to the regimes in the region, some progress has been made,
largely in response to international pressure, in the direction of fairer elections.
However, there do exist groups committed to using violence to advance an
Islamist agenda, although it would be a mistake to identify Islamism exclusively
with such groups or to view all opposition elements as exponents of either
Islamism or violence.  Marat Yermukanov suggests that Kazakhstan has been typ-
ical in trying to assuage Western concerns by expressing rhetorical support for
democratization while suggesting that cultural and economic factors, and the
threat of Islamist violence render speedier progress toward democratization and
political and economic liberalization inadvisable, if not impossible, and justify
interference with non-governmental organizations, opposition parties, religious
groups, and the media.61 Shahram Akbarzadeh, in an assessment of Uzbekistan,
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suggests that the regime in power “. . . has used the imagined Islamic threat as an
excuse for its authoritarian politics internally, and territorial consolidation exter-
nally.  Tashkent’s border initiatives are ostensibly aimed at securing its territory
against Islamic infiltration, but they are seen as evidence of Uzbek hegemonic
mind-set in other Central Asian republics.”62 With the outbreak of the Tulip
Revolution only months in the past, events in the other republics have not stood
still.  Violence has erupted in Uzbekistan, and concern has arisen that the regime
has intensified efforts to suppress opposition.63
CONCLUSION
It may sound terribly romantic to talk about “the Great Game,” and certain-
ly in the aftermath of military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is an
understandable concern from a geo-strategic viewpoint about the stability of
Central Asia and any possibility that the more violent manifestations of Islamic
revivalism may shift their base of operations to the Central Asian republics or
simply see them as convenient bases from which to strike against the nation-
building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  One could focus on the geo-strategic
considerations posed by the region’s proximity to Russia or to the Middle East or
to Afghanistan or to India and Pakistan.  The region does occupy a location of
strategic importance in a number of respects, and this understandably has influ-
enced Western policy toward the region.  It is entirely understandable that
Western governments would wish to secure co-operation from governments in the
region.  On the one hand, there are legitimate concerns about militant forms of
Islamic revivalism, like the IMU.  On the other hand, there is also a tendency on
the part of authoritarian regimes to use this threat as a broad excuse and justifica-
tion for human rights abuses.  Western governments, however, should not align
themselves so closely with authoritarian regimes that they overlook the human
rights abuses and suppression of Islam and other religious practice that exists in
the region.
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